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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-2865 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JEREL JACKSON, a/k/a Jinx 
 
  Jerel Jackson, 
                        Appellant  
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-13-cr-00622-001 
District Judge: The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 25, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  October 18, 2017)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Chief Judge.  
  
On November 14, 2013, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against 
Jerel Jackson alleging sex trafficking of three individuals, one a minor, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1594(a).  Ten months later, on September 19, 2014, 
Jackson’s appointed counsel sought leave to withdraw and new counsel was 
appointed.  A superseding indictment was filed in January of 2015, and a second 
superseding indictment followed in February, asserting a total of five counts of sex 
trafficking, with two of the counts alleging that the victim was a minor.   
On March 18, 2015, after a thoughtful and extensive plea colloquy with the 
District Court, Jackson pleaded guilty to the five-count second superseding 
indictment.  Early on in the proceeding, the District Court asked Jackson why he was 
pleading guilty.  Jackson responded by saying: “I’m pleading guilty because I am 
guilty.”  JA123.  Once the District Judge carefully reviewed the rights that Jackson 
would waive if he pleaded guilty, he asked Jackson:  “[D]o you still want to give up 
your right to a trial and enter a plea of guilty?”  JA137.  Jackson responded 
affirmatively.  The judge followed this question by inquiring if Jackson was “sure,” 
and Jackson affirmed that he was.  Then the judge asked if Jackson had “[a]ny 
question in your mind about this?”  JA138.  Jackson confirmed he did not.  The 
government then made a detailed proffer of the factual basis for the plea.  In response 
to the Court’s inquiry, Jackson confirmed that he wanted to enter a guilty plea and 
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that he was making that decision of his own free will because he was guilty.  JA144-
45.  The Court asked Jackson how he wished to plead.  Jackson answered: “Guilty.”  
JA146.  Then, the District Court asked Jackson how he was pleading as to each of 
the five counts.  Jackson responded “Guilty” five times.  JA146-47.  The Court 
proceeded to enter its findings on the record, which included that Jackson’s plea was 
knowing and voluntary.  It accepted Jackson’s plea and adjudged him guilty of the 
five counts.  JA147. 
In November of 2015, Jackson requested the appointment of new counsel.  
The District Court conducted a hearing on the request.  JA153.  During that hearing, 
Jackson advised the court that he “wasn’t trying to withdraw a guilty plea at all. . . . 
That’s not what I’m trying to do. . . . [A]ll I ask for is what you just did, is just give 
me counsel so I can consult . . . and see if that’s what I should . . . do.”  JA176. 
More than a year after pleading guilty, on May 16, 2016, and before 
sentencing, Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Jackson asserted he 
was innocent of all charges filed against him and always wanted to proceed to trial 
and have his innocence established.  JA52.  The District Court denied the motion.  
Thereafter, the Court sentenced Jackson to 30 years’ imprisonment and 5 years’ 
supervised released.  This timely appeal followed.1   
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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 On appeal, Jackson argues that: (1) counsel was ineffective for permitting 
him to enter a guilty plea; (2) the District Court abused its discretion by denying the 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (3) his sentence was improperly calculated.  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm Jackson’s convictions, but vacate his 
sentence and remand for resentencing. 
 At the outset, we decline Jackson’s invitation to review his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  “It has long been the practice of this court to defer the 
issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack.”  United States v. 
Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003).  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
endorsed this approach.  Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-06 (2003).  
 Jackson contends that his counsel was ineffective because they failed to move 
for the dismissal of the allegedly deficient indictment.  According to Jackson, this 
presents a legal question that may be addressed in a direct appeal.  United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).  We appreciate this argument, but we 
do not agree that this is strictly a legal question.  If there is legal error, “[t]he court 
must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.”  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).  Because there were three 
attorneys who represented Jackson in the trial court, we believe that the record 
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should be further developed in order to resolve the deficient performance prong and 
that the District Court should address this ineffectiveness claim in the first instance.   
 Jackson also argues on appeal that the District Court erred in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  In determining whether to grant Jackson’s 
motion, the District Court appropriately considered “(1) whether [Jackson] asserts 
his innocence; (2) the strength of [Jackson's] reasons for withdrawing the plea; and 
(3) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  United States 
v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003).  The Court found that Jackson’s 
“subsequent proclamations of innocence are not credible.”  JA11.  It further 
concluded that Jackson’s “bases for the withdrawal request are lacking in factual and 
legal merit; and a tremendous potential for prejudice will likely result if the 
government is required to litigate this case at this time.”   Id.   
 We are highly deferential to the District Court’s credibility determinations and 
reverse only upon a showing of clear error.  Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. TVM 
Bldg. Prods., Inc., 855 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2017).  We review for abuse of 
discretion a District Court’s decision to deny such a motion.  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252.  
In light of the record before us, we conclude that the District Court did not err, clearly 
or otherwise, in making its adverse credibility finding regarding Jackson’s 
proclaimed innocence.  Because “[b]ald assertions of innocence . . . are insufficient 
to permit a defendant to withdraw [his] guilty plea,” we will not disturb the District 
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Court’s order denying the motion.2  United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
Finally, Jackson points out that his sentencing range was erroneously 
calculated in applying U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 to obtain the combined offense level.  Here, 
although the District Court correctly determined that five units were present, it 
incorrectly increased the combined level offense adjustment to five levels rather than 
the proper four levels.  JA206.  The government concedes that Jackson’s guideline 
range was erroneously calculated and that this miscalculation affected his substantial 
rights.  Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and will remand the case to the 
District Court for resentencing.  See United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 
550 (3d Cir. 2017) (acknowledging that we generally vacate a procedurally deficient 
sentence and remand for resentencing).   
 
                                                 
2 In addition, our review of the record reveals that the District Court’s credibility 
assessment also has support from statements Jackson made at sentencing.  He 
acknowledged that, contrary to his family’s belief that he was entirely innocent, he 
was guilty of some of the things or some of the counts that I’m being charged with. 
But I can assure you that I never once in my life forced a woman to do anything 
sexual . . . .” JA226.  He also confirmed that he “wanted to withdraw [my guilty 
plea] . . .  even though I know for a fact that I am guilty of certain things that I did.”  
JA233. 
